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 Abstract  
This paper explores the motivation for the use of social audits in the supply chains of multinational companies 
(MNCs) sourcing clothing products from a developing nation. We investigate the practice of social audits in the 
supply chains of MNCs based upon a range of interviews with key operatives within the garment industry in 
Bangladesh. Our results show that social audits are typically not advancing workers’ rights but where there are 
advances, they occur because of the financial penalties that would otherwise be imposed on suppliers (through 
loss of contracts). Consistent with the notion of institutional decoupling, our results suggest  that MNCs appear 
to use social audits as an instrument to maintain and re-establish their legitimacy rather than ensuring 
accountability to workers (who are the most affected stakeholders). This is the first known study that 
investigates how social audits are undertaken by MNCs sourcing products from a developing nation; the 
implications this has for supply chain claims; what motivations drive the adoption of such audits and what, if 
anything, are the likely outcomes from the process. 
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1. Introduction 
As international organisations and markets get bigger and as the remoteness between civil 
society and its dominant economic organs gets ever greater (Beder, 2006) so, it seems, does 
the need for these organisations to profess their social, environmental and sustainability 
credentials. One does not need to have a view either way on the social responsibility of 
business to recognise that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is big business (Banerjee, 
2007). Equally, one does not have to have a particular view on the charming argument that 
organisations only exist at the behest - and with the approval - of their stakeholders 
(Blowfield & Murray, 2008) to recognise that social and environmental credentials are 
amongst the characteristics that organisations use in their negotiations of - and with – markets 
and civil society (Thielemann, 2000). Initiatives as diverse as, for example, the Marine and 
Forestry Stewardship Councils, Soil Association accreditation, the Global Compact and ISO 
14001 are, regardless of any judgement of their efficacy, substantive phenomena with which 
an increasing number of large organisations empirically engage. 
Given the increasing extent to which corporations rely upon such accreditations to legitimate 
their remote sourcing of products and the increasing degree to which their western customers 
require to legitimate their own continued purchase and consumption in a form which has the 
appearance of moral acceptability, it then comes as something of a surprise to appreciate how 
little is known about the empirical substance of the attempts by corporations, NGOs, 
accrediting bodies and others to  ensure the integrity of the supply chain and the robustness of 
its claims to be in conformance with a range of seemingly impressive and important  
standards. This study focuses on social audits, a particular attempt by Multinational 
Companies (MNCs) sourcing products from developing nations.  While issues associated 
with social audits are not new, research on social audits is limited relative to the amount of 
research being undertaken in relation to social disclosure within the context of developed 
nations ( see review within Deegan, 2014) and developing nations (Islam, 2010; Islam & 
Deegan, 2008; Belal & Owen, 2007; Belal & Roberts, 2010). Furthermore, prior social and 
environmental accounting research focusing on developing nations (see, Deegan & Islam, In 
press, Momin & Parker, 2013; Belal & Cooper, 2011; Belal & Roberts, 2010; Islam & 
Deegan, 2010; Islam & Deegan, 2008; Belal & Owen, 2007) has surprisingly overlooked to 
investigate corporate social audit practices. This is despite the fact that many corporations - 
particularly MNCs operating in developing nations (see, KPMG, 2008; GRI, 2011; Islam & 
McPhail, 2011) - have embraced social audits as a part of their social responsibility attempts.   
The investigation of the social audit practices adopted by MNCs sourcing products from 
developing countries is important because of the role globalisation has had in shifting 
production from western countries - where many rights and obligations are often enshrined in 
law - to many parts of the developing world where business organisations tend to adopt 
varying levels of workplace standards (World Bank, 2007; WTO, 2004). Social audits can  
provide a means for determining the standards of performance being adopted within 
particular organisations and whether they are of a standard consistent with what might be 
anticipated by the managers of MNCs, or other stakeholders (such as investors, consumers, 
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government, and so forth). The outcomes from social audits can then be employed, at least of 
a ritualistic manner, as a catalyst to implement plans to improve corporate social 
performance.  
In this paper we focus on the clothing sector. In the clothing sector the shift of production 
from developed to developing nations has increased greatly over the last 15 years (World 
Bank, 2007; Shelton & Wachter, 2005; Shelton & Wachter, 2005). MNCs headquartered 
within developed countries now typically outsource their products to suppliers within various 
developing countries (World Bank, 2007; WTO, 2004; Rahman, 2004; Wilkins, 2000) 
typically in a quest for low cost production (Kabeer & Mahmud, 2004; Wilkins, 2000; 
Custers, 1997).  
We explore the role of social audits from a particular notion of institutional theory, this being 
decoupling. According to the concept of decoupling, organisational practices such as social 
audits can be adopted as ‘ritual’ forms and structures—which means that there is apparent 
disconnection between the adoption of social audits and any real change in either corporate 
accountability in relation to improvement of working condition or in relation to those 
conditions themselves. The concept of decoupling is ingrained within institutional theory 
which posits that organisations ‘ritually’ adopt forms and structures in order to survive or to 
maintain legitimacy but have no direct connection with any search for efficiency and any 
desire for actual/real change (Fiss & Zajac, 2006 Dillard, Rigsby & Goodman, 2004).  The 
concept of decoupling is helpful as a notion to provide insights into whether social audits are 
just used as a tool for companies to avoid negative implication for their survival or to create 
real change in their practices and in their accountability to the wider community.   
By focussing on the social audit practices of MNCs sourcing clothing products from 
Bangladesh, we intend to explore whether ‘key players’ in the process believe that social 
audits are instigated to improve the social performance of an entity, or whether they are put in 
place to decouple from the practices with the primary motivation being that related business 
benefits shall follow. We undertake our investigation by way of a number of interviews. In 
undertaking our interviews we hope to reveal insights that are not otherwise available in the 
social and environmental accounting literature. To gain an insight into the activities and 
motivations associated with social audits we interviewed people working within MNCs that 
source products from Bangladesh, people employed as independent social auditors within 
Bangladesh, and personnel from Bangladesh supply companies that supply products to 
MNCs. Specifically, six internal social auditors from MNCs, seven external/third-party social 
auditors (who were actively engaged in auditing on behalf of MNCs), and eight senior 
personnel from local garment manufacturers were interviewed.  
Our results will show that social audits become a symbolic or ritual strategy for MNCs to 
maintain or regain legitimacy rather than being a primary means of improving corporate 
accountability, or improving the welfare of different stakeholder groups. That is, we will 
reveal insights that suggest that claims made by corporations that they are placing the welfare 
of workers at the centre of their social audit practices might not actually be reflective of the 
underlying processes and motivations. The evidence suggests that, consistent with  the notion  
of decoupling,  social audit is used by companies  as a ritual strategy rather than to create 
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improvement in working conditions within their supply chains. We also find that  a particular 
‘crisis’ often precedes the instigation of (what we will come to know as) a third party social 
audit: such audits are believed to be more rigourous as compared with regular internal social  
audits.  We will suggest that the  ritualistic nature of the use of social audits assists 
organisations in avoiding negative issues that might threaten  their survival and their 
legitimacy.  
The balance of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, Section 2, we will 
explore the background of social audit and its use in the supply chains of clothing MNCs 
sourcing products from a developing nation such as Bangladesh. In Section 4 we provide 
some theoretical perspectives to potentially explain why such organisations instigate social 
audits. Section 5 discusses our research methods including interview process and Section 6 
provides the results of interviews. Section 7 provides discussion and conclusion.  
 
2. Social audits and the clothing supply chains: Background  
 
2.1 Social audits  
Carroll and Beiler (1975) defined social audits as an attempt to measure, monitor and 
evaluate the organisation’s non-financial performance with respect to its social policies and 
objectives. As they state: 
social audits derive from the assumption that economic performance is being monitored and 
appraised elsewhere (in financial audit) by the firm. Social audits delve into what may be termed 
contemporary social issues such as minority employment and relations, environmental 
protection, community relations, consumerism issues, etc. (p. 597) 
Social audits come in many forms. Owen (2007) and Gray (2000) argue that there can be two 
mutually exclusive objectives of a social audit. On the one hand, they can be undertaken for 
management control purposes: for assessing risk, managing stakeholders, image 
management, public relations, seeking out opportunities and efficiencies, publicising that the 
organisation is living by its values, and/or for maintaining legitimacy. By contrast, social 
audits might be undertaken for accountability, democratic, and sustainability purposes with 
the aim of benefiting society through an understanding of how the pursuit of an 
organisation’s objectives is, or is not, contributing to social welfare. Under this latter 
perspective, consideration would be given to stakeholders’ rights to information, balancing 
power with responsibility, empowering stakeholders, or owning up to eco-justice and 
ecological footprint failures. Thus a `social audit’ is a term used widely and might include 
anything from operations undertaken by large organisations themselves to monitor and assess 
their own processes and procedures through to explicit attempts by civil society groups to 
hold governments and organisations to account (Cooper et al, 2005; Gray et al, 1996).  
 
When civil society is the focus of the social audits, then terms such as `external social audits’, 
`shadow-accounts’ or `counter-accounts’ are more helpful and capture more of the intention 
and conflict inherent in these attempts to develop accountability amongst those very reluctant 
to do so voluntarily (Medawar, 1976; Adams, 2004; Gallhofer et al, 2006; Gray, 1997; Dey et 
al., 2011; Owen et al, 2000). When the focus of the social audits is upon managerial 
5 
 
preoccupations, then these are more akin to organisational internal audits. Here, social audits 
might be conducted by internal or external audit teams and might be undertaken voluntarily, 
or as a required part of a supply agreement. They can be undertaken with the aim of 
establishing whether an organisation is complying with its own (or other recognised) 
principles and standards (Gray, 2000). In this sense they are a tool by which an organisation 
can plan, manage and measure its `social responsibility activities’ and monitor both internal 
and external consequences of these activities.   
 
It is with this internal manifestation of the social audits that we are concerned here. 
Surprisingly, despite the considerable attention given to social audits generally within the 
social accounting literatures and the obvious relevance of internal audits to compliance 
auditing generally (Cahill, 1998; Elad, 2001), those literatures reveal relatively little work 
specifically on the social audits as compliance audits. There is, it must be said, a substantial 
coverage of issues of compliance in specialist literatures in, for example, medicine, 
engineering, public policy, operations and production management, and international 
standards but even the increasingly important literature concerned with monitoring and 
controlling the supply-chain (see, for example, Locke and Romis, 2007) seems to have made 
little inroad into the accounting and social accounting literatures. Given the increasing 
shrillness of corporate claims regarding responsibility and sustainability; in light of the 
growing importance of the accreditation of such matters as fair trade or sustainable forestry, 
for example; considering the steady interest that the (social) accounting literature has in 
sustainability  reporting; and in recognition of the importance and understanding of auditing 
procedures and the craft itself, an exploration of the social audit seems long overdue for the 
accounting literature. 
 
Although there has been a transformation in both what we should understand by audit and 
how we conceive of the auditing process itself (Power, 2007) as well as an explosion in the 
activities and processes to which the technologies of audit are applied (Free et al, 2009) there 
remains considerable uncertainty around which of the many functions an audit might be 
serving at any one point; the extent to which its complex ambiguities are understood by those 
commissioning and deploying the audit and how an audit comes to acquire its credibility and 
legitimacy (O’Dwyer et al, 2011; Free et al, 2009; Funnell & Wade, 2012). What is certain is 
that we have come a long way from the view that an audit is a simple technology essentially 
adding a reliability to a set of regulated financial numbers – a rational evidence-based process 
of determining accuracy and reliability.  Audit is a `technologising’ process (Power, 1991) 
which is a central response to and component of neo-liberal institutionalization (Power, 
1997). It is a problem-simplifying practice (Power, 1991, p38) reducing processes to that 
which is auditable and thereby gaining legitimacy and an aura of objectivity (O’Dwyer et al, 
2011).  It seems highly probable that the gaze of the audit is culturally determined and its 
meaning and interpretation constantly contested (Power, 1991). There is also much that is 
ritualistic in audit and it may well be that this sense of ritual has the capacity to cover up 
conflicts in order to maintain social legitimacy of the audit and that which is audited (as Mills 
& Bettner, 1992 argue) and that, in all probability, the ritual itself, the routinisation, actually 
lends audit its efficacy and legitimacy (as MacLullich, 2003 suggests). When we direct our 
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attention to the specifics of the social audit in supply chain it becomes apparent that a great 
deal of this is actually unclear at the moment. 
 
2.2 A brief overview of the clothing supply chains using social audits 
As Mellahi et al (2010) show, the supply chain has become an increasingly central element of 
modern commercial activity. They define it as “the organizational crystallization of real 
material flows that form the life cycle of the product from cradle to grave” (p216). There is 
no obvious reason why this should not apply equally to service flow as well.  Of course, the 
supply chain is crucial not just because of the strategic, economic and financial and quality 
issues that arise when manufacturing and other supplies are remotely sourced, but also for the 
ethical, social, environmental, cultural and political issues that seem inherent to it, (Mellahi, 
2010). To a significant degree, the values, principles and practices of the supply chain 
become essentially embedded in the goods and services that the (typically) western MNCs 
supply to their (typically) western (or at least wealthy) customers, (Henriques, 2007; Klassen 
& Vachon, 2012; Marsden, 2011). As such, supply chains have begun to attract the attention 
of researchers.  
 
From disciplines as diverse as medicine, engineering, public policy, human resources, 
operations and production management, environmental management and international 
standards come a whole range of explorations that vary from the procedural and technical 
(see, for example, Hernandez, 2010; Klassen & Vachon, 2012) to the increasingly puzzled 
and frustrated (see, for example, Pedersen and Andersen, 2006; Egels-Zandén, 2007; 
Ghonkrokta & Lather, 2007; Locke et al. 2007; Lund-Thomsen, 2010) as the diversity of 
practices, standards, objectives, conflicts and imponderables within supply chains begin to 
reveal themselves. For example, Locke and Romis’ (2007) attempts to explain the very 
different practices in two Mexican Nike suppliers both of which had been audited as 
“satisfactory” or Silva-Castenada’s (2012) exploration of when evidence of failures of 
standards is inadmissible in palm oil certification both suggest that greater attention needs to 
be paid to the monitoring, surveillance and auditing processes that sit at the heart of the 
supply chain. Similar conclusions are reached in the examination of standards as they are 
developed, negotiated and applied in such areas as agriculture, (Tzilivakis et al, 2012), 
marine accreditation (Gondor and Morimoto, 2011), child labour (Stigzelius and Mark-
Herbert, 2009), children’s rights (Carvalho, 2008) and sustainable development more widely 
(Bendell et al, 2011).  
 
Despite the attention given to social audits in the social accounting literature and the obvious 
resonance between social audits, compliance audits and the claims and concerns within 
supply chains, there has been relatively little direct attention in this literature to understanding 
and exploring the supply chain itself - (see for example: Medawar, 1976; Adams, 2004; 
Gallhofer et al, 2006; Gray, 1997, 2000; Dey et al., 2011; Owen et al, 2000; Owen 2007). The 
relatively thin level of our understandings of social and compliance audits suggests that we 
should adopt an exploratory approach to the empirical domain here. That decision, in turn, 
seems to counsel a focus on one industry from which some depth and worthwhile insight 
might be sought. It was in this light that the present work chose to focus on the garment 
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industry. There were a number of reasons for this choice  including, but not limited to, a 
familiarity and experience with the industry and the high levels of public outcry that have 
been evident in many western countries over supply chain concerns associated with the 
garment industry, especially regarding slave and child labour (see, for example, Ansett and 
Hantover, 2013). 
 
Over the last 15 years MNCs have greatly increased the international spread of their supply 
base by shifting their production locations from developed nations to many developing 
nations (World Bank, 2007; Shelton & Wachter, 2005;  WTO, 2004; Rahman, 2004; Wilkins, 
2000). As a result, clothing manufacturing in many developed countries has almost ceased 
(Shelton & Wachter, 2005). Many of the high-profile clothing MNCs  have moved their 
production to low-wage countries such as Bangladesh, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, India, 
China and Cambodia (World Bank, 2007; WTO, 2004). In transferring clothing  production 
to developing countries - where there are lower domestic social standards - many high-profile 
MNCs will, as we have seen, face pressure from NGOs, the media and western consumers for 
sourcing products from suppliers that do not provide workplace conditions of the kind that 
would be expected in the MNCs’ domestic environment (Frenkel, 2001; Frenkel & Kim, 
2004; Roberts, 2003; Kolk, & van Tulder, 2004; Egels-Zanden & Hyllman, 2006; Haltsonen 
et al., 2007; Hughes et al., 2007; Spar, 1998; Wah, 1998; Frenkel & Scott, 2002). Such 
pressure in turn inevitably motivates the MNCs to exert pressure on suppliers to adopt 
workplace practices that are acceptable to western consumers (see for example Emmelhainz 
& Adams, 1999; Kolk & van Tulder, 2002; Radin, 2004; Sethi, 2002). 
 
The  clothing industry is just one of many that have been part of the development, typically 
with global NGOs, international labour organisations and the United Nations, of various 
codes of conduct in relation to workplace practices. For example, there is a growing number 
of Western NGOs, labour organisations, civil society and consumer associations joining 
various alliances, such as the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) in the UK, and the Fair Labour 
Association (FLA) in the USA. The aims of these alliances are to advance social standards 
and to improve accountability in relation to labour conditions in global supply chains 
(Hughes et al., 2007). Similarly, a growing number of international industry-based 
organisations have developed standards for organisations operating in, or sourcing products 
from, developing countries. One notable example is SA8000 which was developed by Social 
Accountability International (SAI), a non-governmental, multi-stakeholder organization 
whose mission is to advance the human rights of workers around the world.  SAI believes 
that business codes of conduct need to be carefully based on international norms and linked 
to independent verification and it seeks to advance the rights of workers by promoting ethical 
working conditions, labour rights, corporate social responsibility, and social dialogue.  
 
Many global corporations sourcing products from a developing country incorporate human 
rights standards which are the same or similar to SA8000
1, or based on ILO’s human rights 
                                                 
1 SAI accredits qualified audit organizations to certify compliance based on SA 8000.  Over 1.2 million workers 
are employed in over 2,100 SA8000 certified facilities in 60 countries (http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=472). 
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standards, in their own codes of conduct (Islam & McPhail, 2011). Along with their codes of 
conduct, many MNCs disclose their social audit outcomes in media such as annual reports 
and stand-alone social reports (Islam & McPhail, 2011). For example, Lindex (one of the 
largest Scandinavian clothing companies that source products from Bangladesh) state in their 
2009 CSR report:  
Since 2004, Lindex has been part of the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI2), which 
transcends sector boundaries and involves collaboration between over 450 companies, mainly 
European, which currently use a joint Code of Conduct and factory audit system. All audits are 
reported in a joint database where it is possible to follow developments at the different 
factories.…During 2009, Lindex conducted a total of 274 audits. Of these, 192 were initial 
audits, i.e. the first audit at a supplier, and 82 where re-audits. 199 were conducted by Lindex’s 
own auditors and 75 were conducted by external companies. In a factory audit, an assessment 
is made in 13 different areas and each area is assigned a score of 0, 1, 2 or n/a depending on 
how well the requirements have been met. When each part of the Code has been given a score 
(0-2 or n/a) a final assessment of the factory is made. During 2009, 24 factories were on the 
Stop List. Infringements include incomplete or contradictory documents which result in it not 
being possible to verify the demand for a minimum wage or where a supplier has used factories 
which have not been audited and approved by Lindex for certain parts of its production. During 
2009, a total of 157 suppliers and factories took part in training activities initiated by Lindex 
and BSCI. 
If such companies are apparently both so determined to undertake systematic enquiry into 
their supply and go to the trouble of informing their stakeholders in such detail there is 
clearly a matter of some substance here deserving of attention
3
. 
 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
This paper embraces a specific aspect of institutional theory, that of decoupling, to examine 
whether the use of social audits is substantively reflective of real change in performance or 
accountability practices in relation to working conditions. A key reason why institutional 
theory is relevant to us who investigate voluntary reporting or auditing practices is that it 
provides an insight on how organisations respond to changing social and institutional 
pressures and expectations in order to gain or main or repair legitimacy (Deegan, 2014; 
Islam, 2009). Despite its promise, there seems to be a lack of research that explores 
institutional logics for the motivations behind social auditing.   
 
 Decoupling  is a key insight of institutional theory which suggests that organisations 
‘ritually’ adopt forms and structures, but which have no direct connection with any search for 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 BSCI audits are performed by the same authorised certification institutions that perform SA8000 audits, which 
means that a company can opt to upgrade to SA8000 certification. More information is available about the 
operation of the BSCI on its own website, at www.bsci-eu.org. (Sockmann Group’s Sustainability Report, 2009, 
p.11). 
3 It may not be irrelevant to note that the detail illustrated in Lindex’s report would clearly involve a non-
insubstantial amount of economic resources. In disclosing this detail we may well be able to infer that the 
company and its shareholders consider this to be money well-spent from a business case, risk and reputation 
management point of view.  
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efficiency and any desire for actual/real change (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Christensen & 
Molin, 1995; Fiss & Zajac, 2006 Dillard, Rigsby & Goodman, 2004 ; Westphal & Zajac, 
2001). Decoupling is when there is a mismatch between formal organisational practices (for 
example, disclosures or social audit practices) and actual organisational actions (real events) 
(Dillard et al., 2004). Meyer and Rowan, (1977, p. 58) argues that decoupling is “a deliberate 
disconnection between the organisational structures that reinforce legitimacy and 
organisational practices considered the most efficient by the organization”.  Fiss and Zajac, 
(2006) describes decoupling, a situation in which compliance with external expectations is 
only symbolic, not effective (Fiss & Zajac, 2006). And hence, the way organizations embrace 
decoupling is that they take a range of strategies from an avoidance strategy to ‘loose-
coupling’  strategy to  concealment strategy by adopting ritualistic practices which deviate 
from actual action/behaviour as a response to pressures and expectations as imposed by the 
community (Orton & Weick, 1990; Westphal & Zajac, 2001; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Tilcsik, 
2010). 
 
The organisational motivation to decouple from formal practices (including disclosure and 
social audit practices) is to acquire, maintain or retain legitimacy whilst also relieving the 
tensions created by external pressures for change. Where external signals of formal adoption 
contradict the reality of internal practices, organisations are adopting elaborate rituals to 
signal acceptance of change – a response in the form of ritualistic conformity (Rika, 2009). 
While, ceremonial, symbolic or ritual signals of conformity to particular standards or codes 
of conduct or even formal regulation lead to organisational isomorphism (Holder-Webb & 
Cohen, 2012), organisations have the incentive to decouple their public statements or  
disclosures from actual practices. Through decoupling, the key incentive for organisations is 
to survive or to maintain legitimacy. 
 
Theoretically, within the accounting literature, it is expected that when organisations 
decouple actual performance from apparent practices, public social or environmental 
statements or the disclosure practices do not convey the substantive nature of performance 
information. As Deegan (2009) mentioned : 
 "…. social and environmental disclosures can be used to construct an organizational image that 
might be very different from the actual organizational social and environmental performance. 
Thus the organizational image constructed through corporate reports might be one social and 
environmental responsibility when the actual managerial imperative is maximization of 
profitability or shareholder value" (p.364). 
 
While  the notion of decoupling  has been used in accounting literature more broadly (see a 
review within Deegan, 2009), there is a lack of research to investigate the motivation(s) 
which might lead organisations to decouple their new and formal practices such as social 
audit practices from their actual behaviour. The notion of decoupling is an important 
theoretical notion that may well help  inform us whether or not organisations undertake real 
actions to create accountability in relation to working condition within the MNCs’ supply 
chains.  
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Consistent with the notion of decoupling, we expect while companies decouple from social 
audit practices with the primary motivation being that related business benefits shall follow, 
they appear to have no direct connection with any search or desire for actual/real change. If 
we are to consider the public positions taken by many MNCs, we find that they often project 
the view that their social audits are undertaken to ensure that stakeholder views are 
considered and that company performance does not disadvantage various stakeholder groups. 
For example, the Wal-Mart Sustainability Progress Report 2010 (p. 44) refers to its social 
audit process by stating: 
At Wal-Mart Factory Workers’ Voices are heard.  Wal-Mart values the opportunity to interact 
with workers during our visits to factories. In doing so, we gain the worker’s perspective on the 
factory, including what can be, and has been, improved. This dialogue is vital to factory 
improvement, and the insight provided enables our team to focus efforts on areas that can 
tangibly enhance the lives of workers and result in factory improvements…Throughout all parts 
of our company, we work with NGOs to identify areas for improvement in our business, 
establish new goals and verify the data we compile on each of our initiatives to ensure that we 
are making good progress.  They work with us because they are eager as we are to see positive 
change in our business practices and supply chain. We thank them for their efforts and 
willingness to work with our company. 
More generally companies often have public statements that suggest a  desire to create real 
improvement in  the working conditions in developing nations along with – and directed by -  
consultation with stakeholders.   
H&M annual report 2007 (p.42) states: 
Taking responsibility for how people and the environment are impacted by our activities is 
important and is essential to H&M’s success. H&M conducts a dialogue both internally and 
with external stakeholders concerning how the company can develop further. It is therefore 
important to formulate and convey clearly how we should work, especially since H&M does 
not own any factories of its own. Our products are instead produced by around 700 independent 
suppliers, primarily in Asia and Europe.  
The Lindex CSR Report, 2009 states: 
To constantly develop and improve our sustainability work, we have an ongoing dialogue with 
groups of stakeholders. Together we discuss what Lindex can improve and how and what the 
stakeholders want Lindex to report and communicate. Lindex is a member of different local 
networks, what are termed Brand Meetings, in Turkey, Bangladesh, India and China. Together 
with other international fashion companies we discuss and co-operate in order to move the CSR 
work forward. In Turkey, India and Bangladesh, we are also active in Round Tables. 
The above statement makes no reference to any business benefits that might result from 
consulting with, or working with, various stakeholder groups. Again, whether such public 
pronouncements actually reflect corporate intentions or motivations for undertaking social 
audits is something we investigate within the context of a developing country – specifically, 
Bangladesh. Therefore, the notion of decoupling is a helpful theoretical framework to 
understand whether social audits become ritualistic practices  of MNCs or create a real 
change in the working conditions within their supply chains.   
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4. Research method 
This research focuses on clothing which MNCs source from Bangladesh. This study utilises 
interviews as the major source of data collection and our interviews were concluded in mid-
2010. The interview participants were located in Dhaka, the capital city of Bangladesh, where 
the country’s garment industry is based. Bangladesh presented itself as the location for data 
collection for a number of reasons. Not only did one of the researchers have familiarity and 
good access to companies and other participants in the country but, additionally, the country 
is one that relies upon exporting products to developed countries and it is known that social 
audits are employed by MNCs and their suppliers. We chose interviews as a research method 
because through interviews we are able to reveal insights that would not be possible via 
secondary research methods.   
 
A range of interviewees were sought so that we might gain a range of points of views from a 
number of different participants in the audit process.  We initially sought the advice of a 
corporate manager from a multinational buying company and two officials from the 
Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters  Association (BGMEA)
4
. They helped us 
to identify relevant participants
5
. As part of the process of identifying potential interviewees 
we also reviewed secondary sources such as BGMEA archives, International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) archives as well as corporate annual reports and media releases. This 
process identified a list of 23 people split more or less evenly across the three groups we 
came to focus upon. These three groups comprised: (i) the company representatives from the 
MNCs who either commissioned and/or undertook the supply chain social compliance audits 
on behalf of their employers (`MNC internal auditors’ hereafter); (ii) those who were 
commissioned to conduct the audits as independent auditors or consultants (`independent 
auditors’ hereafter); and (iii) those who worked  for the local manufacturing companies that 
supplied the garments and, in their role as senior managers were either subject to audit and/or 
undertook their own audits internally (`suppliers’ hereafter).  Of the 23 people approached for 
interview, 2 declined to be interviewed
6
. 
 
Detail about the eventual 21 interviewees is shown in the Appendix to this paper. The 6 
`MNC internal auditors’ were all in charge of a social audit division (and thus part of the 
                                                 
4 The BGMEA is a member of the Bangladesh Employers federation and, understandably, occupies a non-
neutral position in this research. BGMEA itself is subject to direct NGO pressure (see, for example, 
http://www.sacw.net/article3430.html) but there is published research (whose provenance is difficult to judge) 
which suggest that BGMEA’s activities have advanced the cause of the workers (see, for example, Rahman & 
Hossein, 2010). 
5 Whilst this is not an ideal method of sampling, it was the best available to us as introductions and guidance 
were needed throughout the process. We have been unable to detect any obvious biased effect of taking our 
sample from these sources. 
6 Inevitably a key group to interview are the employees and it is apposite to make mention of the absence of 
interviews with them. This was a deliberate (and informed) action based on pilot interviews with labour 
representatives; the tensions that firm-directed interviews with workers would have raised, the difficulty of 
interpreting the range of workers in the event of taking a more ad lib approach to contacting employees plus the 
concerns expressed by ethics clearance at university level. Given the focus of the audit itself, our judgement is 
that we are likely to have missed little of direct relevance by this approach – although a more critical take on the 
legitimating processes would suggest a different and more penetrating analysis (Cooper et al, 2005). 
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internal audit management) of their companies during the period of data collection. Their 
observations give us a substantial insight into 4 major MNCs  in the industry. The 7 
`independent auditors’ were selected from a range of organisations intimately involved with 
social audit. We were hoping that we may be able to rely upon these respondents for some 
degree of independence from the MNCs. Three of those interviewed worked at an accounting 
firm affiliated with PricewaterhouseCoopers and were senior staff within the social audit 
division. Of the remaining four, two were independent consultants (one local consultant and 
another representative of a foreign consulting firm); and, two were senior officials from two 
local NGOs (one person was an Free Labour Association (FLA, USA) auditor, and another 
person was funded by the Canadian International Development Agency  (CIDA) to monitor 
garment workers’ rights)7. Finally, the `suppliers’ were represented by 8 senior managers 
from major local garments manufacturing and supply organisations. These are the 
organisations from which major MNCs source their products. Of the 8 interviewed, four had 
held senior positions within BGMEA at some point in the past.  
 
This group of 21 interviewees represent a cross section of those associated with the social 
audit process via a range of different roles. They claimed between 6 and 25 years’ experience 
(average of 12 years). All participants suggested that they were directly involved in the 
strategic decision making of their respective organisations. As a result, we perceive them to 
be knowledgeable about the operations and strategies of their organisation and the impression 
gained was that the numbers interviewed were sufficient to allow a degree of theoretical 
generalisation
8
. 
 
Consistent with prior research (see for example, Islam and Deegan, 2008; Deegan and 
Blomquist, 2006), we developed a semi-structured interview guide so that the process was 
flexible enough to allow space for various views to emerge. Interviews ranged from half an 
hour to three hours in length. All interviews were conducted in person. Whenever possible, 
interviews were audio recorded and subsequently transcribed. In cases where taping was not 
possible, extensive notes were taken during the interview.  
 
Some of the text from the interviews will be reproduced within this paper where it is 
considered to be reflective of the opinions of the group. Whilst the details of these 
interviewees appear in the Appendix, the interviewees were referred to by a coded number. 
The code (MNC internal audit 1-6; independent auditor 1-7; supplier 1-8), does not 
necessarily reflect the order in which they appear in the appendix. This is intended to 
                                                 
7 We found these two local NGOs with foreign affiliation were actively engaged in workplace monitoring and 
social welfare activities so as to protect the interest of garments workers in the global supply chains.   
 
 
8 For each of the three groups of interviewees, the interviews led us to conclude that additional or new 
interviewee/s were unlikely to add new information or to add to the overall story on social audits in the garments 
industry. For each group, if there is homogeneity among population, a sample of six interviews may be justified 
to enable development of meanings, themes and useful interpretations and this informed the selection of 
interviewees (Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 2006). The number of interviewees is consistent with prior social and 
environmental accounting research (see for example, Islam & Deegan, 2008; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006). 
13 
 
preserve the anonymity of respondents to as great a degree as possible whilst still allowing 
sufficient information to be provided about the respondents.  Such approach is consistent with 
the interview method outlined in Islam and Deegan, 2008.  
 
In developing the semi-structure interview questions we relied upon the following research 
questions to guide the focus of our questions. While interviewees were allowed scope to 
freely talk about various related issues, these research questions provided the basis for our 
interview questions.  
1. What is the nature of the social auditing that MNCs undertake to monitor the 
activities of their suppliers in Bangladesh? 
2. What motivates the initiation of a social audit? 
3. Which stakeholders do social auditors engage as a part of the auditing?  
4. What perceptions do local suppliers have in respect of the social audits and 
associated activities implemented by multinational buying companies?  
5. What input do local workers have to the social audit process? 
6. Do social audits ultimately change workplace conditions? 
 
 
5. Findings 
 
5.1 Nature of social audit practices  
All participants were asked to provide a background to the social audit practices with which 
they were involved. All interviewees emphasised the compliance nature of the audit
9
. All 
audits appeared to have the central objective of determining whether MNCs sourcing 
garments from manufacturers in Bangladesh were doing so from organisations that appear to 
comply with acceptable global social standards. In relation to acceptable social standards, 
particular reference was made to in-house codes of conduct/standards developed by MNCs, 
and to ILO standards, SA 8000 and European standards such as Business Social Compliance 
Initiative (BSCI). There appeared to be a wide-spread perception that there was a degree of 
consistency in the requirements of the different codes or standards being used to guide the 
nature of the social audits.  
Suppliers were expected to be aware of the required standards and to ensure compliance 
therewith. As a chairman of one major supply company stated (who was also an industry 
official on a labour rights organisation): 
Buyers and authorised bodies and individuals nominated by the buyers (internal or third 
party auditors) have identified a number of issues for us to follow (typically included within 
social codes of conducts). The audit is basically to see whether we have complied with these 
requirements [supplier 4]. 
 
                                                 
9 It rapidly became clear that although a range of terms such as social audit, compliance audit and social 
compliance audit were used – they were used interchangeably and as far as it is possible to tell, all related to 
precisely the same basic notion of auditing compliance.  
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In relation to issues covered by the social audit, most of the interviewees explained that the 
audits mainly focus on factory working conditions. As one of the social auditors of a major 
global clothing and sports retail company stated: 
In our social compliance audit we look at issues including child labour, health and safety, 
discrimination, compliance with law, forced and prison labour, working hours, harassment 
and abuse, notice and record keeping, and wages and benefits [MNC internal audit 5]. 
 
This range of issues was typical of those most noted by the interviewees as being the focus of 
social audits. Issues to do with environmental performance were not addressed within the 
process of undertaking the social audits despite the fact that environmental performance 
could in turn adversely impact employees and local communities. 
 
The processes employed by both the MNCs internal auditors and external independent 
auditors appeared to be broadly consistent. There was also agreement that audits for new 
suppliers were different to periodic audits undertaken for existing suppliers. Greater effort 
was taken in relation to potential new suppliers and there was an expectation that suppliers 
pay at least some of the costs of the audit (although some audits were also paid for by 
MNCs). As one internal auditor of a multinational buying company stated:  
When we select a vendor or manufacturer we negotiate the price of the goods first. After the 
price negotiation, and before placing an order, we undertake two types of audits; a technical 
audit and a social compliance audit. The technical audit is a part of quality management; it is 
performed by the separate team within the same management. We, the compliance team, are 
responsible for compliance audits. Before undertaking the audit we send an invoice to the 
vendor or manufacturers to pay our audit fees. We charge $1350 (USD) for the first audit and 
$1090 for subsequent audits. After the first audit, and if we find some issues that need to be 
addressed, we give them 120 to 160 days to resolve the issues and after that we do subsequent 
audits. If we find aggregated violation of various social standards, such as use of child 
labour, we immediately eliminate the factories as a potential source of any products. In 
Bangladesh we, the internal auditors, do these audits but in Pakistan we use third party 
auditors to do that because we do not have our own experts there. [MNC internal audit 5]. 
 
As a further reflection of the reduced activities performed on audits, other than first time 
audits, an independent auditor from a major audit firm stated: 
A first time audit is very tiring, it requires time and many things we need to follow but when 
we complete first audits it is easy for us to do follow up audits. When we set the time for 
audits with the manufacturer, the time is not specific. For example we can say we will come to 
your factory anytime between 13th and 25th of June. Then when we go for a full day audit, this 
is a little bit unannounced as we don’t provide specific dates for the audit, we follow 
available social standards we have; it is mainly something directly adopted from BSCI. While 
the first audit addresses each and every issue carefully, in the subsequent audits we just 
concentrate on the issues which suppliers have not complied with previously. The level of 
compliance influences the extent of follow up audits. [independent auditor 4]. 
 
The impression gained from the interviewees was that the first time audits are undertaken to 
uncover breaches of acceptable standards but when follow up audits are undertaken they are 
very much scaled back unless particular breaches have previously been identified or if 
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particular news has come to light that particular social performance problems are potentially 
present. Such insights raise issues about the continuing effectiveness of social audits in 
uncovering poor practices. 
 
Many teams appeared to follow similar audit procedures – typically with five broad elements. 
As one internal auditor of a multinational company stated: 
We pursue five steps in completing a full day audit. First we have an opening meeting with 
management. In this meeting we clear our plan of actions, we also request them to be honest 
and transparent and cooperate in respect of allowing access to their workers, accessing 
necessary documents, and so forth. Then we go do our floor visits; we have a number of 
health and safety standards to check when we have physical visits; we do have a check list for 
these, additionally we also check whether they have under age workers that should be 
investigated. Then after floor visits we do document checking. Here for example we check 
employee salary sheets, age records, attendances, license checking (such as environmental 
clearing certificate, fire license, boiler operation license). Then in the fourth step, we 
interview workers; we interview young looking workers, female and male workers separately, 
workers from different divisions including dying sections, cutting sections, sewing sections, 
finishing sections, and packaging sections. We undertake random selections of workers. 
Finally we complete the auditing with a closing meeting with the top management. We discuss 
aspects relating to cooperation, and non-cooperation if any. We might demand further 
information, clarification and assistance as needed. We leave them without providing our 
audit findings. We send them our findings or discuss our findings with management the 
following day, or some other day [MNC internal audit 5] 
 
By way of comparison, one external auditor from an accounting firm [independent auditor 1] 
identified the same steps although the final meeting with management was specifically 
mentioned. 
 
From the interviews we did get a sense that the auditors went into the field with the intention 
of completing their onsite investigations within a day
10
. Whether this coincides with what 
western consumers believe is happening is questionable. Nevertheless, a ‘social audit’ is 
undertaken and the MNCs can report this to interested stakeholders (albeit that many of them 
do not disclose the period of time undertaken on the audit). In establishing the time 
constraints for the audit before the audit begins, the auditors are clearly in danger of 
determining what can and what cannot be done: regardless of what needs to be done to 
undertake a compelling audit.  
 
MNC internal auditors appeared to follow company policies and guidelines which they check 
for compliance. External or third party auditors often merge globally acceptable standards 
(say ILO principles on human rights, BSCI, FLA guidelines) with their clients’ guidelines 
and policies. Interestingly, company codes of conduct and external auditor’s adopted 
principles appear similar as they all focus on ILOs basic human rights standards.  As one 
executive of a local NGO which is an affiliated audit partner of the FLA stated: 
                                                 
10 Some audit could be longer than single day, but we did not ask further question on it.  
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We are an FLA [Free Labour Association in USA) affiliated auditor. When we go for a factory 
visit we require both FLA guidelines, which are basically based on ILO’s basic standards, and 
our client’s (multinational companies) own standards. We also must respect local labour laws 
which are also overlapping with ILO standards [independent auditor 5]. 
 
A chief compliance officer of a multinational company stated: 
When we have our own audits we basically follow European common standards such as BSCI 
[Business Social Compliance Initiative]codes of conduct. Almost all European Union 
multinational companies are now following BSC’s code of conduct. This is similar to SA 8000 
as BSCI is a partner organisation of SA.  When a third party is appointed for auditing, they 
need to follow BSCI’s code of conduct in addition to whatever they do [MNC internal audit 
1] 
 
In relation to audit outcomes, interviewees were asked about the ratings provided. All internal 
and external auditors explained that they had reasonably standardised criteria by which to 
evaluate suppliers’ social performance. In a first time audit they typically evaluate the firm by 
way of a rating. They have a number of specific issues upon which their rating is based. If 
suppliers have complied with the majority of requirements on an audit checklist, then 
subsequent audits are scaled back. As an internal audit of a major MNC stated: 
The rating is important to us as well as to the suppliers. Based on the rating results from the 
first audit, we do a follow up audit. Every brand follows the same procedures. Let me talk 
about our ratings; the rating scale ranges from acceptable to unacceptable. Acceptable 
means 100% perfect or 100% compliance with all specific social standards. There is no 
company in Bangladesh, not even in South Asia, that is 100% compliant. Then we have our 
next rating which is ‘acceptable with issues’ (not 100 % perfect; minor adjustments are 
required). For example with health and safety issues, there should be 70 items in the first aid 
box but if has only 30 items, or say a company has a separate medical room but not any first 
aid box in the required place, so adjustment is needed. Then another rating is ‘needs 
improvement’. To see ‘acceptable with issues’ and ‘needs improvement’ we do follow up 
audits which take 90 days from our first audit. Finally we have another rating which is 
‘unacceptable’. If we find child labour, we rate this ‘unacceptable’. If we do not get adequate 
explanations for young looking workers we just classify them as child labour. Last year in 
2009 I cancelled three manufacturers for not providing clear explanations for young looking 
workers. This is an absolute violation of the core social standards. If we have three follow up 
audits for ‘needs improvement’ we terminate the relationship for one year. Next year if they 
want to sell their product to us they will require us to do pre-approval audits [MNC internal 
audit 5]. 
 
Other auditors and MNCs follow a similar rating scale but with different names (such as 
green, orange and red). As one internal auditor from a MNC stated: 
We follow internationally acceptable guidelines to score compliance performance.  We rate 
as ‘green’ if we see manufacturers comply with each and every issue on our check list. We 
give ‘orange’ when we find some important and necessary specific standards need to be 
implemented. We give ‘red’ if you find major violation of our codes of conduct. For example, 
child labour is not acceptable, maternity leave must be ensured, and there must be zero level 
harassment of women workers. For any deficiencies which are not major (orange), the 
17 
 
factory is given a deadline to address the problem and a follow up audit would be conducted 
after three months [MNC internal audit 2].  
 
The over-riding impression is that the various social audits follow a fairly similar process in 
terms of procedures being undertaken, and the ratings being provided. This was something 
that we were previously unaware of. Having gained some knowledge of the nature of the 
social audits the next issue we sought to investigate were perceptions about what drives the 
instigation of a social audit. 
 
5.2 Motivation behind the social audit practices 
Interviewees were asked why they believed the social audits were instigated in the first place.  
Interviewees explained that a central reason is that they are a buyers’ requirement and that 
social audits would not be undertaken in the absence of a demand from multinational buying 
companies. From the local manufacturers’ and suppliers’ perspectives, social audits are 
effectively mandatory given that social audits typically come with every order placed. This 
was seen to represent a departure from the requirements of 10 to 15 years ago when the main 
issues of concern were cost and product quality. As a senior executive of a supply company 
stated: 
Yes the social audit is the buyers’ requirement. …...  This is a pre-condition of finalising and 
executing any order with the buyers. We have to sell our products and that’s why we must 
follow certain codes of social conduct as required by the buyers [supplier 3]. 
 
A regional chief of a compliance department of a major MNC emphasised this point from the 
buyer’s point of view: 
For new suppliers we do extensive compliance audits as we don’t have any idea about their 
factory standards. But we have many manufacturers who have been supplying goods to us for 
the last 5 to 10 years, we know their social standards - we don’t stop auditing but in this case 
we focus on limited areas of our choice. We never tell them that they don’t need to be 
monitored. If we told them they won’t be monitored then you can guess what might happen; 
from tomorrow they might start employing cheap labour, who knows they might start employing 
child labour and this is very risky for us! You know child labour is such a sensitive issue! 
[MNC internal audit 4]. 
 
The social audits were widely seen as a risk reduction strategy and were undertaken because 
of perceived business benefits rather than necessarily seeking to advance the interests of 
workers.  
 
One unexpected insight that emerged from the interviews was that MNCs typically use their 
own internal auditors to undertake social audits. However, they tend to employ external or 
third party auditors only when the MNC face a major threat as a result of media accusations 
and/or sustained NGO campaigns, (such as the use of child labour, or any other inappropriate 
behaviour by the suppliers). There was a belief that the involvement of third parties increases 
the likelihood that information would be accepted or believed by various stakeholder groups. 
Information provided by independent third parties is considered to have greater credibility. 
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There appeared to be a belief that external third party reviews are an instrument for corrective 
action, and as a means to pacify concerned stakeholders. As one external auditor stated: 
You may be aware that MNCs are often criticised because of a belief that their supply sources 
are not ethical. There have been many incidents that the western news media has frequently 
highlighted such as showing pictures’ and videos’ of children working in the factories; this 
could be in the Wall-Mart factories, Gap factories, Nike factories and so on. NGOs and labour 
right bodies often take actions against many MNCs for not being responsible: for not meeting 
maternity leave expectations, for paying poor wages, or for massive fire accidents. You may 
have heard of the massive accidents at Spectrum where many workers died; this issue became 
so sensitive within the European community because the news media and NGOs directly linked 
a European-based MNC, for which Spectrum was manufacturing garments at the time, to the 
accident. Many people are also aware of how the US news media accused Wal-Mart by 
showing children working in the factory and coming out of the factory; you probably also know 
how a group of NGOs and labour rights took action in a US court against Wal-Mart for poor 
working conditions and underpayments in its supply factories. We saw many of these being very 
sensitive as western consumers react so quickly to these events. These sorts of events have lead 
to the appointment of third party auditors who are believed to be more credible agents to 
investigate these matters. We found concerned multinational companies usually take corrective 
actions based on our audit outcomes particularly when a crisis leads the companies to appoint 
us [independent auditors 2]. 
 
An internal auditor of a multinational company also stated: 
We need to listen to what consumers want from us. They don’t want us to use child labour or to 
follow poor working practices. We need to make sure there are no such incidents in the factory. 
We, the internal auditors, are quite capable of doing this. But when something goes wrong such 
as fire accidents— the way media highlights as if we are directly responsible for this; such as 
child labour—the way media suddenly shows it - it really gets beyond our control. When 
something goes wrong, you can imagine third party auditing is imminent. You can expect our 
headquarters in USA to directly assign an accounting firm or NGO to investigate the incidents 
and to make public the existence of the third party involvement. [MNC internal audit 2] 
 
Again, we very much get the feeling that social audits are about addressing legitimacy threats 
and protecting brand image rather than being motivated by any underlying ethical reasoning. 
Social audits were considered to represent a risk reduction strategy (rather than primarily as 
means of improving employee conditions), and the nature of the work appeared to be 
influenced by whether the media was involved in highlighting particular issues. The 
management motivation to minimise such risk and maintain legitimacy is consistent with the 
notion of decoupling. Also, the greater the media attention or perceptions about the severity 
of the potential crisis, the greater the perceived likelihood that independent third parties 
would be involved in the social audit practice. These results are broadly consistent with the 
large body of literature which generally suggests that the nature of social disclosures, and 
social and environmental initiatives, is reactive to legitimacy threatening events. Although 
such legitimacy threatening incidents influenced management to appointment of third party 
auditor, this may reduce the decoupling but it is not the long-term corporate strategy. 
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5.3 Stakeholder dialogue and inclusion as a part of social audit process 
As we showed earlier in this paper, MNCs often make public statements that stakeholder 
dialogue and inclusion is an integral part of the social audit and compliance process. 
However, the majority of the interviewees indicated that their audit programs did not have 
provision to engage people outside of the factories. Indeed there was a degree of scepticism 
about the need, in normal circumstances, to talk to people outside of the organisation such as 
labour leaders, NGOs or the local community. One representative response was: 
It is a common and regular exercise to interview a sample of workers and mid and top 
managers of the factories as a part of social audit. No other people are considered necessary to 
contribute to the audit process [independent auditors 1]. 
However, like the use of third party auditors, the extent of external stakeholder engagement 
also appeared to be reactive to the existence of a legitimacy crisis. As one external auditor 
noted: 
When there is a media campaign against an organisation, or labour unrest, for the interest of 
proper investigation we interview outside people adjacent to the factory as they are believed to 
have some important information. These people may be shop keepers, people gossiping in the 
tea stall, and so on [MNC internal audit 2]. 
 
From the interviewees we found that auditors generally do not talk to external stakeholders 
such as NGOs, human right organisations, or external labour leaders. This is inconsistent with 
how MNCs often publicly describe their social audit engagement processes (in such media as 
annual reports or sustainability reports).  
 
When asked whether there is a need to talk to NGOs and human rights organisations as a part 
of the audit, all of the interviews (except two) said that in normal circumstances there would 
be no need to talk to external people. As one internal auditor noted: 
We don’t have to talk to NGOs or the local community unless we are instructed from the head 
office to do so. In the normal circumstances we can manage the situation internally, so why 
should we talk to the local community or to NGOs or even to the media? This might only 
inflame an issue.[MNC internal audit 3]. 
 
All the internal auditors were asked whether they knew about whether any other stakeholder 
groups or representatives could get access to the workers in the factory. The following 
response was very typical: 
Look we are responsible for monitoring factory compliance; we must know who is coming in 
and who is not. We must know if NGOs or labour leaders or journalists want discussion with 
us, the workers or manufactures because we are responsible for the factory compliance 
activities.  We rarely engage NGOs, labour leaders or journalists to monitor supply practices. 
There is typically no point to have discussions with them; we are doing the right thing and 
everything is under control. When things are in control why would we need to hold discussions 
with NGOs, media or labour leaders? [MNC internal audit 3]. 
 
There was an irony here of which the internal auditors seemed unaware: namely that a key 
issue in the social audit is to prevent legitimacy crises through decoupling- but when there is 
a real crisis, the MNCs were more likely to require the social audit be undertaken by an 
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independent third party – often an NGO body – a representative of the very people who are 
normally excluded from the audit. Furthermore, it transpires that where NGOs were 
appointed they considered themselves to be acting as both auditors and as external 
stakeholders. Two of the NGOs interviewed said they monitor activities in their role as an 
auditor as well as in the role of a stakeholder who protects workers’ interests.  
When we enter a factory we interview workers and they open up to us and we discuss their 
problems and hold discussions with the managers to resolve the problems. It is good that some 
companies are monitored by us. We are protecting the workers’ interests [independent audit 
5]. 
 
It was not apparent either that such NGOs also undertook wider stakeholder consultation, 
assuming, apparently, that their role as NGO made such additional dialogue unnecessary. 
This apparent lack of consultation with external parties such as NGOs or labour leaders - 
unless it is deemed necessary for addressing particular crises – was unexpected. This nature 
of exclusion of external stakeholders is consistent with the avoidance strategy of 
decoupling—the social audit has been legitimised by avoiding stakeholder consultation to 
create real change in corporate accountability.     
 
5.4 Clothing manufacturers’ perceptions of social audits 
Officials from all seven of the garment manufacturing firms were asked general questions 
about their perceptions of social audits and the tensions the activities create. All interviewees 
considered that they are subject to pressure during the audit as audit outputs might lead to the 
cancellation of orders. Two representative responses included: 
This provides huge mental tension for us. We are always in fear of losing our contract [supplier 
2]. 
I couldn’t sleep from the day they are coming to the day they are giving me the reports. To me 
the audit creates great pressure. If they give me an unacceptable report it would be disastrous 
for my business. If they accept me it is still a burden for me because I have to pay huge audit 
fees every time they audit. Today one multinational company is auditing, tomorrow another, the 
day after a consultant, another day an accounting firm and these audits are extensive; they go 
through every file they want, they talk to any workers they want to. We always need to take 
corrective actions based on their findings [supplier 1]. 
 
Although a number of the interviewees appeared to struggle to see real benefits from 
undertaking a social audit, some of the suppliers considered there were some limited benefits. 
They said a good audit report in itself can create financial benefits (interestingly, no mention 
was made of the benefits to employees).  
The audit brings benefit to us if we get a good report from the auditor. We are doing business 
with the international partners. If one partner gives us a good compliance report we can sell it 
to other prospective buyers. During the period in which we are negotiating a new order 
reference to a good audit report becomes very effective. Compliance has a financial value to 
us! [supplier 5] 
Auditors basically make our factory compliant with international standards. Consumers in 
developed countries would like to see whether we implement human rights as they are 
concerned about this. It is very much consumer driven. At the same time we know if we 
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implement human rights, it brings us financial solvency. I think human rights and financial 
solvency are positively correlated. If we don’t have human rights we can’t sell products to our 
customers [supplier 4].  
 
When auditors (both internal and external) were asked about the pressures or tensions caused 
by their factory visits they said they understood that manufacturers felt significant pressure 
for fear of losing contracts. Representative responses included: 
Irrespective of the nature and type, an audit is a source of pressure and tension. …. when we go 
for factory visits and talk to random workers, managers do not know how workers answer our 
questions. Workers might say, child workers are used here, they might say they are sexually 
harassed or physically assaulted. These are all gross violations of social standards. For any of 
these violations, the factory would be suspended or multinationals can cancel order. This is 
very costly [independent auditor 1].  
What can I say? Sometimes if we give them poor ratings because of the violation of particular 
social standards, they become so emotional. One I found last year started crying and sought 
more time to make adjustments. We are also sensible if we find no major violations, we give 
them reasonable time to take corrective actions [MNC internal auditor 3]. 
Reflecting on the perceptions from the local suppliers it was interesting that none of the 
suppliers apparently considered the benefits that social audits might create for employees. 
Rather, they saw social audits as a potentially costly exercise that could only create benefits 
(of a financial nature) if the outcome of the audit was positive. Such results are generally 
consistent with Islam and Deegan, (2008) who found that the disclosure of social 
performance information reflected the expectations of MNCs, rather than because of any 
underlying ethical reasoning pertaining to accountability.  As MNCs use social audit as a 
ritualistic practices and lightly consider to create actual accountability, this nature of finding 
is consistent loosely coupled strategy (Orton and Weick, 1990).   
 
5.5 Local workers’ input as part of audit process 
As we have seen, stakeholder involvement in the social audit process was generally low 
although all parties seem to expect that workers would be interviewed as part of the process. 
In terms of the input that workers had to the social audits, the following representative 
responses were provided: 
We interview workers, we select some, and employers also select some for us to interview 
[MNC internal auditor 4] 
 We (manufacturers) allow auditors to interview our workers. We are not sure what the 
auditors ask our workers. What we know is that this is almost compulsory - that the auditor 
must talk to our workers. We have no choice [supplier 6]. 
It is a core audit step that we talk to workers; we have a questionnaire for them. Whatever we 
ask workers we give the managers a general idea of it.  Whatever answers we get from workers 
we provide aggregate results to the manufacturers. We call them in a room where there is no 
camera; worker selection is random. [independent auditor 1]. 
 
In terms of the conduct of the interviews: 
We create environments to get information. We interview individually and we also interview in 
a group, it is very effective because if one worker says something, others agree or disagree and 
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others can correct if someone goes wrong or somebody tells a lie, they have eye contact with 
each other, this is an interesting way to collect information about what actually is going on. 
[MNC internal audit 2] 
Workers sometimes say negatives and sometimes say positives about management attitudes to 
them. They are open to disclose their problems. We call them in a room where there is no 
camera, where they feel free. They feel uncomfortable at first but we have to create an 
environment so that workers can freely talk to us. We discuss audit outcomes with managers to 
take corrective actions [independent auditor 2]. 
 
Generally, it is the auditor who selects the workers to be interviewed. Many of the workers 
are perceived to be uncomfortable in identifying problems because of the implications that 
could follow for both themselves and the organisation. Such levels of discomfort are not 
consistent with the public commitments disclosed by the MNCs. Rather such levels of 
discomfort gives a clear difference of actual actions from the ritualistic practice or the use of 
social audits.   
 
The auditors (internal and external) were also asked whether audit outcomes are shared with 
the workers. The results indicated that there is no direct communication with workers about 
the audit outcomes or about the level of importance that the auditors attributed to their 
various concerns. Three representative responses included:  
While workers are allowed to respond to our guided questions, and to raise arguments around 
them, we never ask open questions. We never discuss with workers that their particular 
arguments have been accepted or particular complaints have been solved [independent auditor 
3]. 
When we finish the audit we discuss findings with managers but we don’t disclose many of the 
things we have found, we follow some non-disclosure policies. We only discuss the issues which 
managers need to address and correct. This discussion is only with managers, we don’t go to 
workers for further discussions [MNC internal auditor 3]. 
When workers can understand the development or improvement of the working conditions, they 
must assume that their discussions were fruitful. We disclose specific audit outcomes neither to 
workers nor to management. We give management the aggregate results; we never discuss with 
management about what workers answered during interviews. Workers are assured and 
protected that what they said during the interviews remains confidential [MNC internal 
auditor 1]. 
 
Although the workers voices are heard in the audit process, it is difficult to know to what 
extent the worker were (and perceived themselves to be) free from coercion
11
. The auditors 
and suppliers appeared to recognise that the employees would have fears about providing 
negative information and it is clear that the level of dialogue was limited through both the 
restriction on the use of open questions and the lack of follow-up in terms of how the 
                                                 
11 It is apposite to make mention of the absence of interviews of the workers themselves. This was a deliberate 
(and informed) action based on pilot interviews with labour representatives; the tensions that firm-directed 
interviews with workers would have raised, the difficulty of interpreting the range of workers in the event of 
taking a more ad lib approach to contacting employees plus the concerns expressed by ethics clearance at 
university level. Given the focus of the audit itself, our judgement is that we are likely to have missed little of 
direct relevance by this approach. 
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organisation was to address particular concerns. There is no sense here that the welfare of 
workers is paramount. The audits seem almost ritualistic so as to provide the basis for social 
compliance with the requirements imposed by MNCs. If engagement with the stakeholders is 
ritualistic and potentially manipulative then such processes will not necessarily advance the 
interests of less powerful stakeholders, albeit that the actions might be economically rational 
from the perspective of the organisation (Wadham, 2009). Again, we had the feeling that the 
nature of the social audits were such that they were not being conducted to improve the 
welfare of workers, but were undertaken in some form of ritualistic manner so as to provide 
the basis for compliance with the requirements imposed by MNCs—this finding is consistent 
with the notion of decoupling. The way social auditors ran the social audit was to avoid 
providing workers feedbacks of conducted audit or the audit results. This type of avoidance 
strategy deviating from real action to improve working condition is consistent with the notion 
of decoupling (Orton & Weick, 1990; Tilcsik, 2010).  
 
Given our concern about whether the social audits were creating positive outcomes for 
workers, the last issue we explored in our interviews was whether, from the perspective of the 
interviewees, real social benefits accrued as a result of the social auditing activities. 
 
5.6 Social audits as a means of improving working conditions? 
When questions were asked about whether the social audit activities created improved 
working conditions, the responses were mixed. Whilst there was a general view that social 
audits can lead to improvements in working conditions, there were also a number of issues 
raised that negated the scope of improvements that could be attained. Where improvements 
were made the interviewees were of the opinion that they were made because of economic 
reasoning. In explaining how the audits led to improved employee conditions, one 
representative response was: 
There are a number of reasons why there is a positive change in working conditions. First the 
position of a social auditor within the company is permanent and their sole responsibility is to 
implement MNCs commitment to viable and globally acceptable working conditions. Second, 
for whatever reason, the activities of MNCs and suppliers are continuously monitored by global 
NGOs and the media. Third but not least, because of these, workers are aware about their 
human rights and responsibilities; they are now not only productive but also to some extent 
skilful in raising their voice if anything goes wrong. The continuous monitoring by internal and 
external parties gives workers a sense that if MNCs try to do business with suppliers in 
Bangladesh then both parties have to follow social standards. Is this not a good change?  
[independent auditors 7]. 
 
In terms of how economic sanctions seem to motivate workplace improvements, two auditors 
stated: 
Our mission is noble and unique. We create a stable working environment by assuring that our 
code and local laws are not violated. We are doing business for our joint interests and our 
interests are associated with the fact that we must follow social standards. When we audit we 
try to make them understand that they need to take corrective actions if we find any violations 
of social standards. Improvement is a dynamic process, you can’t change it in one night; give 
them time, make them understand that business is important. We take a soft approach because 
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we understand if we immediately suspend the factory or cancel an order then a lot of workers 
immediately become unemployed. For us continuous monitoring would be a less costly option 
as it allows us to gradually change the working conditions [MNC internal auditor 3]. 
We suspend factories if they don’t comply with certain issues such as ensuring workers are not 
physically or sexually harassed; or workers are underpaid. We definitively will cancel an order 
if we find any young looking workers and there is no explanation. We are very strict in 
following these standards. We have huge product sourcing from Bangladeshi manufacturers; 
they want to work with a big buyer like us as. They know our expectations and the majority of 
them behave and change accordingly [MNC internal auditor 2]. 
 
A number of the external auditors and internal auditors suggested that factory managers are 
motivated by their own self-interest and would probably stop ensuring certain conditions 
were met if monitoring was discontinued. A minority of the respondents also questioned 
whether any real change had occurred: 
Truth is, child labour is just waiting to enter the factories whenever we stop auditing. Frankly 
speaking this is not a healthy situation; this is not a long-term solution either. The auditor has a 
role to maintain working condition at international standards but this only lasts for the contract 
period; one year, two years.  If someone is really good, contract may be extended to ten years 
even, but there are not many [MNC internal auditor 1] 
I don’t think the workers’ real situations have changed as we expected. Change is very slow in 
terms of human rights. There is a gap between buyers’ commitment and what is really 
happening here. Compliance comes with a cost but buyers are not contributing monetarily. 
There are still many workers that are humiliated by the mid level managers; workers are 
exploited financially and socially. Their health deteriorates since they are employed in the 
factory, buyers know everything about it. Auditor has limited ability to solve this problem. 
Auditor can identify the problems, they can talk to managers to solve these problems but 
problems are so deep rooted that audits sometimes have nothing to do but to identify problems 
that might be solved [independent auditor 6]. 
 
Those who provided negative comments were asked what MNCs and suppliers should do to 
create fundamental change in working conditions. All said the problem is endemic in poor 
economies like Bangladesh. Policy reform at a national level and mandatory governance or 
audit requirements might assist in reducing violations of human rights. Two representative 
comments were: 
Neither buyers nor suppliers alone can solve child labour and other human rights problems. 
Now buyers are putting pressures on suppliers because of NGO and media campaigns; but how 
long will such pressure be maintained? It has brought change but perhaps it would be better if 
governments - both host and home governments - imposed requirements for multinational 
companies to appoint independent auditors and mandated a requirement that audit reports 
must be communicated with workers and other stakeholders who in turn might protect workers’ 
interest - such as labour rights NGOs. This could reduce some problems. Without independent 
third party involvement any possible benefits to workers will be hampered [independent 
auditor 5]. 
Unfortunately, at present, audit specific outcomes are not discussed. There should be a 
mechanism to allow workers to know whether and how the issues they raised in meetings have 
been addressed. Along with the auditor there should be another independent person who 
participates in the discussion. This person may be a human right activist, an NGO member, a 
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trade union leader, or a representative from a country ILO office. There should be an effective 
governance mechanism which can increase accountability and sustainability. Something is 
missing today [independent auditor 6]. 
 
The above responses are salutary. Although it does appear that the social audit process brings 
positive change, those changes appear to be both operating on the suppliers’ (and buyers’) 
financial self-interest and fundamentally temporary and reversible in nature. Only substantive 
structural governance change seems likely to embed positive initiatives – a situation which 
seems to obtain in many areas of poverty within developing countries. The above responses 
again suggest that the current processes employed within the context of Bangladesh (at least 
as experienced by our group of interviewees) fall short of actual accountability or action 
wherein the interests of affected stakeholders are advanced through a process of open and 
free engagement without fear of subsequent discrimination.  
 
Consistent with various responses recorded throughout the paper, any changes that are made 
occur because of threats of losing supply contracts. That is, only threats or coercive pressures 
are likely to reduce decoupling. However, where positive changes are made there was a 
feeling from some interviewees that such changes should not be considered permanent or 
firmly entrenched. There was a view that if monitoring ceased then many positive initiatives 
would cease. This led some interviewees to suggest that some form of government 
intervention was necessary, rather than leaving it in the hands of ‘markets’. The view was 
that if the advancement of workers’ rights is left to market forces then real sustained 
structural changes in workers’ conditions will either not occur, or will be slow in coming and 
decoupling will persist either through avoidance strategy (Tilcsik, 2010) or through loose-
coupling strategy (Orton & Weick, 1990). The continuance of such change would also be 
dependent upon the media and NGOs continuing to be active in bringing the plight of factory 
workers to the attention of western consumers. Whilst there has been some positive change 
over recent decades the slowness in change is causing some frustration for workers, but they 
tend to be relatively powerless to change the situation. This frustration at times leads to 
campaigns of labour unrest in the Bangladeshi garments sector with protest that in turn 
attracted media attention and potential reputational risks for multinational companies (BBC, 
2010; The Guardian, 2010; Ethical Trade, 2009; ILRF, 2011).  There was a view, however, 
that such campaigns are a necessary strategy for workers to keep the focus of western 
consumers on workplace issues within the context of a developing country. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we have sought to explore the practice of social audits within the context of a 
developing country – specifically, Bangladesh. We have found that social audits are a 
necessary precondition to MNCs entering supply contracts with Bangladesh suppliers. 
Nevertheless, whilst such practices are common in developing countries, within the social 
and environmental accounting literature there is an absence of information about how social 
audits are undertaken within a developing country, and what are the motivations for, or likely 
outcomes from, such audits. This paper provides information to address some of this void. 
That is, we provide insights into the social audit process that readers would not otherwise 
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have access to. Hence part of our research goal was to be descriptive about what actually 
happens when a ‘social audit’ is undertaken within a developing country. 
 
In attempting to understand the nature of the social audits we set out to see if the processes 
being employed were consistent with the notion of decoupling (in which social audit practice 
is a ritual strategy and keeps a clear distance from open and free involvement of various 
stakeholders occurs with the aim of trying to advance the welfare of various effected 
stakeholders). In undertaking our research we interviewed 21 individuals within Bangladesh 
that had sound knowledge of the practices of social auditing being performed in Bangladesh. 
This sample was made up of six internal auditors from multinational buying companies, 
seven external auditors performing social audits within Bangladesh, and eight senior 
executives from major Bangladesh garments supply companies. 
 
Our results suggest that social audits are not typically advancing workers’ rights and where 
there are advances, they occur because of the financial penalties that would otherwise be 
imposed on suppliers (through loss of contracts). We also learned that there appears to be a 
deal of similarity in the process of social audits being performed across the garments industry 
of Bangladesh and that the extent of work performed, and the involvement of independent 
third parties, appeared to be influenced by whether a potential crisis has been identified in 
relation to a particular supplier. Conversely, if nothing negative has been identified with 
respect to contracted suppliers (perhaps through the media or by NGOs) then ongoing 
auditing is reduced in scope. Thus, consistent with the notion of decoupling,  social audit 
becomes a ritualistic practice which support MNCs to maintain legitimacy to the wider 
community rather than creates in real accountability.   
 
A number of persuasive, if tentative, inferences can be drawn from the enquiry. We have 
found that social audits are a necessary precondition for MNCs entering supply contracts with 
Bangladesh suppliers. How widespread this might be would be worthy of further 
investigation. Our respondents identified a high degree of convergence between the different 
codes under which social audits are conducted and there was a noticeable degree of 
agreement on the issues and the procedures which inform the audit. On this latter point, for 
illustration, child and/or forced labour, health and safety and discrimination rank highly. 
Environmental and community issues do not. These agreements seemed to be independent of 
background or function and seemed, as far as one could tell, to be independent of cultural 
context – at least at a superficial level. It also emerged that the social audits are typically 
fairly perfunctory and follow-up audits, superficial or non-existent. The bulk of our 
respondents seemed to be of the view that “independent” auditors – those not directly 
employed by the buying organisations – offered the more credible option in times of 
legitimacy threats from the western media and/or civil society organisations.   While such 
legitimacy threats are likely to reduce decoupling to some extent, it is unsustainable. 
Decoupling strategy will return soon after the legitimacy threats are gone. 
 
This is the first  paper of which we are aware that utilises an institutional notion such as 
decoupling to explore the social audit practices sanctioned by MNCs sourcing products from 
27 
 
a developing nation. While, the findings show that MNCs appear to use social audits as an 
instrument to maintain and re-establish their legitimacy rather than ensuring accountability to 
workers (who are the most affected stakeholders), these,  consistent with notion of 
decoupling, are highly embedded within the social audit and stakeholder engagement 
practices within the Bangladesh garments sector. There appears to be limited accountability 
to employees and to wider stakeholder groups and this in part would contribute towards slow 
levels of progress towards sustainable workplace conditions.  
 
Most importantly, all of the evidence we collated spoke of decoupling strategy via  the social 
audits  as a business-driven events  with two principle functions. The first function was that 
of identifying and minimising risk to the purchasing companies, MNCs. This risk related to 
concerns that information concerning practices that western customers and NGOs found 
unacceptable might find its way into the public domain. The second principle function was 
directly related to this: the very act of using garment manufacturers in developing countries 
(for clear economic reasons) is an act which needs legitimating in the eye of western 
customers and NGOs. However, these two principle functions did not lead to any apparent  
improvement of working conditions or real accountability in relation to those working 
conditions. The social audits serve this legitimating function by creating a significant distance 
from the real action to improve working conditions in a manner consistent with the notion of 
decoupling.  How well the social audits actually fulfil these functions is a more telling 
question:  
 First, the issues of risk may well be worth further enquiry. It was far from obvious 
that the perfunctory and ritualistic nature of the audit could be relied upon to regularly 
identify potential areas of risk as they affected the MNC. Although not specifically 
investigated, the audit functions may well be that its presence is relied upon to 
encourage appropriate self-disciplining and self-audit amongst the suppliers.  
 Second, it would be tempting to characterise the social audits as rituals of legitimation 
whose purpose was to be seen and perceived, not to find or to change. That is, 
although we had not formally established this as a prior expectation nor investigated 
the matter thoroughly, we engaged in this research with an assumption that the audits 
would be substantive endeavours including especially stakeholder dialogue and a 
focus on both labour and community welfare. This turns out not to be the case. We are 
led to hypothesise that what the MNCs’ relevant publics think is happening in a social 
audit and what is actually happening are quite different things. There is certainly no 
evidence that the function is to ensure structural long term change in the conditions of 
the workers and their communities – however we interpret such an ambition.  
 Finally, of the issues our initial review anticipated might arise, the absence of any 
explicit concern over matters of culture and/or the aligning values is arresting. The 
only explicit appearance of such a concern was the recognition that these audits are a 
requirement of the MNCs and, more pertinently, that the emphasis in the audits has 
developed (from quality to conditions) - thereby reflecting changing values of the 
MNCs with which the suppliers must comply. It may well be that it is the absence 
which deserves more attention. That is, are social audits and the imposition of values 
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from the west so engrained that they are no longer remarked upon? That this whole 
process is just one more part of the imperialism of western capitalism seems 
incontrovertible. The one thing the social audits do not seem to be is a mechanism 
through which the betterment of peoples and communities might be rigorously 
pursued.  
 
We acknowledge that the results reported in this paper emanate from one country only, and 
from a fairly limited number of interviewees (21). Nevertheless, these respondents had high 
levels of experience in the practice of social auditing within Bangladesh and the nature of the 
responses across the group were generally consistent in relation to the various issues 
associated with the nature of the social audit engagements, the motivations driving the 
instigation of social audits, and the outcomes that flowed from the activities. So, whilst the 
sample used in this study is not without limitation we believe our insights do provide the 
basis for questioning the public claims that many MNCs have made, and continue to make, 
about their social auditing processes and stakeholder engagement mechanisms. We encourage 
other researchers to pursue this line of investigation. 
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Appendix: Interviewees 
 
 MNC Representatives, 
internal social auditors and 
audit management (MNC 
internal auditors) 
Third party/independent social/compliance 
auditors 
(Independent auditors) 
 
Officials from Garments Manufacturer and 
supply organisations (suppliers) 
 
A Regional CSR Manager 
(Bangladesh, India and 
Pakistan) and chief of 
compliance audit division 
(Bangladesh),  H&M, A 
Sweden based multinational 
companies 
Senior Team member, Compliance audit 
Team, 
A Kashem and Co., Chartered Accountants, 
the representative PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC) 
 
Executive Director and Company Secretary, Tallu 
Spinning Mills Ltd., Mithun Knitting & Dyeing 
(CEPZ) Ltd., Toyo Composite Knit Garments 
Ltd., Pure Cotton Knitwears Ltd. Knit & 
Knitwears Ltd. All are suppliers of garments to 
major multinational companies (Carrefour; Wal-
Mart, Reebok  and many others) 
B CSR and compliance Project 
Coordinator, H&M, A 
Sweden based multinational 
companies  
Social Auditor , 
A Kashem and Co., Chartered Accountants, 
the representative PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC) 
 
General Manager and Company Secretary, Desh 
Garments - A leading export oriented publicly 
traded garments company that supplies leading 
US companies (SEARS Holding, K-MART, 
Coles and many others). 
C Compliance coordinator and 
Auditor, Sears Holdings 
Management Corporation, 
SEARS and Kmart.  
Chairman,  Managing Director and 
Compliance audit specialist, Development 
Consultant and Global Compliance Initiative, 
(A Registered Vendor with the World Bank 
Group) 
 
Manager, Administrative and  Social Compliance 
audit  Division, Desh Garments - A leading 
export oriented publicly traded garments 
company that supplies leading US companies 
(SEARS Holding, K-MART, Coles and many 
others). 
D Compliance Auditor, Sears 
Holdings Management 
Corporation, SEARS and K-
mart.  
Manager, Compliance Audit Division (1999-
2008),  
A Kashem and Co., Chartered Accountants, 
the representative of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). 
Currently, Manager R deR Compliance 
Group- representing Certification 
International (UK) Ltd. 
 
Managing Director, Bonny Apparels (Pvt.) Ltd. A 
supplier of major multinational buying 
companies. Also  Chairman, BGMEA Labour 
Arbitration committee and member of BGMEA 
standing committee 
E Compliance and supplier 
Development Specialists and 
auditor, Wal-Mart Global 
Procurement, An associate of 
Wal-Mart, USA.  
Senior compliance auditor  
A Kashem and Co., Chartered Accountants, 
the representative of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). 
 
Founder and president, Mohammadi Group, A 
leading garments manufacturers who supply 
goods to major US and European multinational 
companies  (H&M, C&A, Zara, Esprit, Sears, 
Wal-Mart, Target ). He was past president, past 
vice president, and several times past director and 
present director of BGMEA 
F Compliance Coordinator and 
auditor, Lindex Bangladesh 
Liaison Office ,   
Project Coordinator and monitor, 
Improvement of Women Industrial worker’s 
conditions Project, NUK (Centre for 
Women’s Initiatives), A CIDA funded local 
NGO. 
 
Managing Director,A&M Knit RSSM Ltd. A 
supplier of major multinational buying 
companies. Also Deputy Secretary, Social 
Compliance Cell, BGMEA and the member of 
BGMEA-ILO project on RMG work 
environment. 
G  Executive Director and chief of compliance 
audit, PHULKI—a local NGO, an FLA (Free 
Labor Association in USA) affiliated audit 
body. 
 
Director, Islam Garments Industries (A group of 
companies), supplying garments to  major US and 
European  buying companies (Wal Mart USA, 
Wal Mart Canada, Otto Versand, M & S; Lindex 
and many others).  Also Past vice president and 
director of BGMEA 
H   Managing Director, Ananta Apparels Ltd., 
Ananta Sportwear Ltd., Ananta Fashion Ltd., 
Ananta Designers Ltd. All garments are supplied 
to major US and European companies (GAP 
International, Haggar, Target Stores, Wal-Mart 
Canada; Woolworth,  M & S Mode and many 
others). Also Chairman, BGMEA social 
compliance cell, member of BGMEA standing 
committee. 
